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COMMENT 

TAX LAW-AvAILABILITY OF THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT TO 
NONCORPORATE LESSORS UNDER THE SHORT-TERM LEASE TEST OF 
I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B) AFTER McNamara v. Commissioner and Connor v. 
Commissioner 
INTRODUCTION 
The Investment Tax Credit (ITC) is a credit against tax liability 
which Congress allows to businesses as an incentive for their purchase 
of qualified property (Section 38 property). t President Kennedy pro­
posed the ITC in 1961 as a measure designed to stimulate the national 
economy. In response, Congress enacted the ITC the following year 
and since that time has reacted to swings in the economy by repeal or 
reenactment of the ITC.2 In theory, the ITC is an incentive to pro­
mote business investment in machinery and equipment. Such invest­
ment results in modernization and expansion of plant and equipment 
which is linked to increased employment and higher per capita in­
come.3 Thus, to stimulate the national economy effectively as in­
tended by President Kennedy and the Congress, it is necessary that 
the credit be applied to actual investments in business property.4 
Lessors are generally allowed to take an ITC for Section 38 prop­
ertyS purchased for lease in their businesses. In 1971, however, Con­
gress enacted I.R.e. Section 46(e)(3) which specifically restricts the 
1. I.R.C. § 38 (1988) creates the Investment Tax Credit (lTC), and I.R.C. §§ 46-49 
(1988) govern the mechanics of its application. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying 
text. See infra note 5 presenting the text of I.R.C. § 38 (1988). 
2. See infra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of legisla­
tive repeal and reinstatement of the ITC. Congress has also reacted to swings in the econ­
omy by changing the amount of the allowable ITC. See infra note 21 and accompanying 
text. 
3. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic 
effects of the ITC. 
4. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
5. In pertinent part, I.R.C. § 38 (1988) provides for a "General Business Credit" as 
follows: 
(a) Allowance of credit.-There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax im­
posed by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to the sum of­
75 
76 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:75 
ability of non-corporate lessors of Section 38 property to qualify for 
the ITC. 6 Enactment of Section 46( e )(3) addressed congressional con­
cern that partnerships or other non-corporate investors could use the 
ITC to shelter from tax income that is unrelated to the investment. 
Ideally, the ITC exceeds the tax liability derived from the partnership. 
The taxpayer is then able to apply the excess ITC against the tax liabil­
ity that is incurred on income from other sources. 7 Congress per­
ceived shelter of unrelated income as undesirable because it subverts 
the goal of the ITC which is to encourage genuine investment in busi­
ness property to stimulate the economy. This shelter is a tax loop hole 
that Congress closed by enacting Sections 46(e)(3)(A) and (B) to es­
tablish criteria for ITC eligibility by non-corporate lessors. 
To qualify for an lTC, a lessor-taxpayer must meet the restric­
tions of either part (A) or part (B). Part (A) provides that the lessor 
either manufacture or produce the leased property.8 Part (B) provides 
(1) the business credit carryforwards carried to such taxable year, 
(2) the amount of the current business year credit, plus 
(3) the business credit carrybacks carried to such taxable year. 
(b) Current year business credit.-For purposes of this subpart, the amount of 
the current year business credit is the sum of the following credits determined for the 
taxable year: 
(1) the investment credit determined under section 46(a), 
(2) the targeted jobs credit ... , 
(3) the alcohol fuels credit ... , 
(4) the research credit ... , plus 
(5) the low-income housing credit .... 
Id. 
6. See infra note 29 for the full text of the statute. In pertinent part, I.R.C. § 46(e)(3) 
provides that the ITC is denied unless: 
(A) the lessor manufactured or produced the leased property or 
(B) [1] the term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) is less than 50 
percent of the useful life of the property, and 
[2] for ... the first 12 months after the date on which the property is transferred 
to the lessee the sum of the [allowable] deductions with respect to such property ... 
exceeds 15 percent of the rental income produced by such property [15 percent test]. 
I.R.C. § 46(e)(3) (1988). 
7. The partnership form of ownership avoids double taxation that applies to the cor­
porate form of ownership. Partnership income is earned by the partnership and passes 
directly to the partners subject only to tax as their personal earnings or income. R. CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW 15-16 n.39 (1986). Thus, the ITC flows directly through to the partner 
as a credit to his personal income. "[T]he federal income tax is assessed against the profits 
of the individual partners. There is no separate partnership income tax, although there is a 
separate corporation income tax." Id. 
Under the corporate form of ownership, the entity is taxed on the income that it pro­
duces. That income is then taxed once again when it is disbursed as dividends to the share­
holders. Id. at 27-28 n.5. 
8. See. e.g., Carlson v. Commissioner, 712 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1983) (taxpayer's sub­
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a two-pronged test to determine eligibility.9 Both parts of the two­
pronged test must be met in order for the ITC to be available to a non­
corporate lessor of Section 38 property. The first prong requires that 
the lessor lease the property for less than half its useful life. The sec­
ond prong requires the lessor's allowable business deductions related 
to the lease to exceed fifteen percent of the income generated by the 
lease.lO This comment focuses exclusively on the first prong of the 
part (B) test. This test requires the lease to be for less than half the 
useful life 11 of the property. 
Although the short-term lease test appears unambiguous, the In­
ternal Revenue Service (IRS), depending upon the facts of a case, has 
successfully argued varied interpretations designed to disallow the 
ITC. 12 The courts have generally given deference to the interpreta­
tions of the IRS and disallowed the credit. In particular, disallowance 
of the ITC has occurred where the lessor and lessee are commonly 
controlled entities. Section I of this comment traces the background 
of the ITC and the related noncorporate lessor provision. In section 
II, two factually similar cases are presented discussing proffer by the 
IRS of a realistic contemplation test in response to the taxpayer's ar­
gument that the terms of the lease document should be respected. The 
realistic contemplation test provides that lease documents, although 
complying with the short-term lease test on their face, should be disre­
garded if the parties realistically contemplated, at the inception of the 
lease, that the leasing arrangement be continued indefinitely. 13 
Although the test purports to look retrospectively to the time that the 
lease was made, the IRS proves its case by presenting evidence that the 
lease actually continued beyond the short-term period. 14 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First and Seventh 
contracting of assembly of apple bins, the leased Section 38 property, not sufficient control 
over processing to be considered manufacture under this section). 
9. See supra note 6. 
10. See, e.g., Freesen v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1986); Seligman v. 
Commissioner, 796 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1986); Nelson v. Commissioner, 793 F.2d 179 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (cases discussing the 15 percent test). 
11. For the purposes of 1.R.c. § 46(e)(3), usefullife is defined as "the present class 
life for such property (as defined in Section 168(g)(2»." ld. See infra note 29 for full text 
of the statute. 
12. The ITC or any tax credit reduces the taxpayer's tax liability for a given year. S. 
SURREY, P. McDANIEL, H. AULT & S. KOPPELMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 
CASES AND MATERIALS 505 (1986) [hereinafter S. SURREY]. Disallowing a tax credit re­
stores the tax due to its pre-credit amount. In addition, the taxpayer may owe interest and 
penalties on any deficiency. ld. at 31-33. 
13. Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988). 
14. ld. at 989. 
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Circuits have disagreed on the proper interpretation of the short-term 
lease test. IS The First Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with the realis­
tic contemplation test of the IRS and denies the ITC. 16 In contrast, 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals gives credence to the terms 
stated within the lease if the court determines that the lessor retains 
the economic risk in the transaction. The lessor is then assumed to 
.have made a genuine business investmentP 
Section III of this comment examines two issues raised by the 
IRS's arguments and the courts' interpretations of the short-term lease 
test. First, statutory language and the varied interpretations are ex­
plored, induding the IRS attack on qualification for the ITC by re­
lated party owners of lessor and lessee. Second, this section discusses 
the legitimacy of the recognition by the courts of administrative defer­
ence to the IRS in light of the varied tests proposed by the IRS to 
disallow the ITC. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ITC AND RESTRICTED AV AILABILITY 

TO NON-CORPORATE LESSORS 

The ITC was first proposed by President Kennedy in 196}l8 and 
15. See McNamara v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1987). 
16. Connor, 847 F.2d at 989. In two related decisions following those in Connor and 
McNamara, the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals applied the Connor court's 
realistic contemplation test and distinguished McNamara on its facts. See Owen v. Com­
missioner, 881 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989); McEachron v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 176 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (Owen and McEachron each challenged disallowance of the ITC on the same 
facts in different circuits of the courts of appeals). 
The realistic contemplation test has also been called the reasonable contemplation or 
reasonable certainty test. The majority of the Tax Court decisions follow the realistic con­
templation test applied in Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988). See, e.g., 
Sanders v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1215 (1984); Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 
T.e.M. (CCH) 674 (1982); Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.e. 867 (1981). 
17. McNamara v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir. 1987). 
18. PresideIit Kennedy commented in' his 1961 President's Recommendations On 
Tax Revision: 
Today, as we face serious pressure on our balance of payments position, we must 
give special attention to the modernization of our plant and equipment .... At the 
same time, to meet the needs of a growing population and labor force, and to 
achieve a rising per capita income and employment level, we need a high and 
rising level of both private and public capital formation .... I am now proposing 
additional incentives for the modernization and expansion of private plant and 
equipment. . . . [W]e should ... now [implement the ITC] to strengthen our 
antirecession program, stimulate employment, and increase our export mar­
kets.... Specifically, therefore, I recommend enactment of an investment tax 
incentive in the form of a tax credit ... [to] be taken as an offset against the firm's 
tax liability . . .. 
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1961). 
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enacted in 1962 as a means to stimulate the economy. 19 However, the 
ITC has had a rather checkered history since its enactment. 20 Its re­
peal or reinstatement has depended upon the state of the economy.21 
The congressional objective in using the ITC is stimulation of capital 
investment in order to infuse new life into the economy when it ap­
pears to be stagnant or stalled.22 
The ITC is available to businesses for investment in qualified 
property, and the effect of the ITC is reduction of tax liability.23 The 
credit is mandatory and must be taken in the year the property is put 
in service in order to arrive at the proper tax liability for that year.24 
The property must be business property acquired for a profit motive 
and the taxpayer must have a depreciable interest in the property.25 
The amount of the credit taken in one year cannot exceed the tax­
19. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3297, 3304. 
20. [d. (ITC first enacted in 1962). S. REP. No. 1724, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, re­
printed in 1966 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4327, 4328 (repealed in 1966 to com­
bat inflation). S. REP. No. 79, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. I, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1198 (reinstated in 1967 when inflationary forces abated). H.R. REP. 
No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. I, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
1645 (repealed in 1969 as part of an overall plan to ensure tax equity). H.R. REP. No. 533, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1829 
(reinstated in 1971, then termed "Job Development Investment Credit," "to bolster the 
economy and create additional jobs by encouraging expenditures on machinery and equip­
ment which have been sagging badly"). [d. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 
reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. at 170 (Congressional concern with equity in the tax system where 
taxpayers have used the credit "to reduce their tax liability to very low percentages of their 
taxable income"). Id. 
21. President Kennedy commented in his 1961 President's Recommendations On 
Tax Revision: 
I believe this investment tax credit will become a useful and continuous part of 
our tax structure. But it will be a new venture and remain in need of review. 
Moreover, it may prove desirable for the Congress to modify the credit from time 
to time so as to adapt it to the needs of a changing economy. 
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961). 
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3297, 3304 (established the ITC at 7 percent); S. REP. No. 36, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 54, 57 (in­
creased the ITC to 10 percent). 
22. See supra note 18. 
23. A tax deduction reduces the amount of taxable income to which the tax rate is 
applied. Alternatively, a credit reduces the tax owed airectly, on a dollar-for-dollar basis. 
Thus, a credit is of greater tax savings benefit. S. SURREY, supra note 12, at 505. 
24. Rev. Rul. 64-138, 1964-1 c.B. 509-10. 
25. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3304, 3318-19; H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 
1971 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1843-44. 
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payer's tax liability.26 The amount of any unused credit is carried 
either forward or backward to the appropriate tax years. 27 
At present, the ITC is generally repealed,28 but I.R.C. Section 
46(e)(3)29 remains valid law and currently applies to property ex­
26. The taxpayer first computes his tax, then computes the ITC which is taken as a 
credit to reduce the tax for which the taxpayer is liable. Credits reduce tax liability on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis. See supra note 23. See also PRENTICE HALL INFORMATION SERV­
ICES, 1989 FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK ~~ 1105,2050 (1989). 
The total ITC for the current year is reported on line 8 of Form 3468 titled: Computa­
tion of Investment Credit. If the taxpayer has ITCs only for 1988, he completes Form 3468 
and enters the appropriate amount from Form 3468 on line 44 of Form 1040. 2 INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, PACKAGE X, INFORMATIONAL COPIES OF FEDERAL TAX FORMS 
191-95 (1988) [hereinafter VOL. 2 OF PACKAGE X]. Form 1040 is titled: U.S. Individual 
Income Tax Return 1988. I INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PACKAGE X, INFORMA­
TIONAL COPIES OF FEDERAL TAX FORMS 19 (1988) [hereinafter VOL. I OF PACKAGE X]. 
If, in addition to an lTC, the taxpayer has "a 1988 jobs credit ... , credit for alcohol 
used as fuel ... , research credit ... , low-income housing credit ... [or] carryback or 
carryforward of any general business credit," the taxpayer stops at line 8 of Form 3468 and 
must then complete Form 3800 titled: General Business Credit. VOL. 2 OF PACKAGE X at 
191. See also supra note 5. The amount from line 8 of Form 3468 is entered on line I of 
Form 3800. The total amount of the General Business Credit available to the taxpayer is 
computed on Form 3800 and the appropriate amount entered on line 44 of Form 1040. Id. 
at 197-200. See also VOL. I OF PACKAGE X 19-20,38 (1988) (illustrating Form 1040 and 
explaining the procedure for completion of line 44 of Form 1040). 
27. "Unused credits for a taxable year can be carried back to each of the three pre­
ceding taxable years and then carried forward to each of the IS following taxable years." 
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. II-50, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4138. 
28. 	 In 1986, I.R.C. § 49 was enacted, repealing the ITC for most property placed in 
service after December 31, 1985. 	 I.R.C. § 49 provides: 
§ 49. Termination of regular percentage 
(a) General Rule.-For purposes of determining the amount of the invest­
ment tax credit ... the regular percentage shall not apply to any property placed 
in service after December 31, 1985. 
(b) Exceptions.-Subject to the provisions of subsections (c) [35-Percent re­
duction in credit for taxable years after 1986] and (d) [Full basis adjustment], 
subsection (a) shall not apply to the following: 
(I) Transition property [defined in section (e)] ... 
(2) Qualified progress expenditure for periods before January I, 
1986.... 
(3) Qualified timber property .... 
I.R.C. § 49 (1988). 

In addition, ITC carryovers for 1985 and preceding years are allowed. I.R.C. § 39 (1988). 

Since the credit is non-refundable and may exceed the tax payable for the year in question, 

Congress has allowed excess amounts of the ITC to be carried forward or backward to 

other years. See supra note 27. 

29. 	 1.R.c. § 46(e)(3) states: 
(3) Noncorporate lessors. A credit shall be allowed by section 38 [26 
U.S.C.S. § 38] to a person which is not a corporation with respect to property of 
which such person is the lessor only if ­
(A) the property subject to the lease has been manufactured or produced by 
the lessor, or 
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cepted from the general repeapo and to resolution of litigation of ITCs 
taken prior to 1986. In addition, because Congress has a lengthy his­
tory of repeal and reinstatement of the lTC, it is conceivable that the 
ITC will take on a larger or different life at a future date.3l 
Congress enacted the noncorporate lessor provision32 restrictions 
to the ITC in 1971 to close a tax loophole which allowed passive inves­
tors to create leasing partnerships in order to shelter from tax, income 
unrelated to the ITC transaction. 33 Income is sheltered from tax lia­
bility through leasing partnerships because partnership income is not 
taxed to the partnership, but rather, to each partner as an individual.34 
Thus, each partner would own a share of the income generated from 
the partnership as well as a share of the ITC. For example, a partner­
ship of doctors could purchase and lease Section 38 property. The 
ITC would reduce tax liability for income from the partnership as well 
as from their medical practices. 35 
(B) the term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) is less than 
50 percent of the useful life of the property, and for the period consisting of 
the first 12 months after the date on which the property is transferred to the 
lessee the sum of the deductions with respect to such property which are 
allowable to the lessor solely by reason of section 162 [26 U.S.C.S. § 162] 
other than rents and reimbursed amounts with respect to such property) ex­
ceeds 15 percent of the rental income produced by such property. 
In the case of property of which a partnership is a lessor, the credit otherwise 
allowable under section 38 [26 U.S.C.S. § 38] with respect to such property to any 
partner which is a corporation shall be allowed notwithstanding the first sentence 
of this paragraph. For purposes of this paragraph, an S corporation shall be 
treated as a person which is not a corporation. This paragraph shall not apply 
with respect to any property which is treated as section 38 [26 U.S.C.S. § 38] 
property by reason of section 48(a)(I)(E) [26 U.S.C.S. § 48 (a)(I)(E)]. For pur­
poses of subparagraph (B), in the case of any recovery property (within the mean­
ing of section 168 [26.U.S.C.S. § 168]), the useful life shall be the present class life 
for such property (as defined in section 168(g)(2) [26 U.S.C.S. § 168(g)(2)]. 
1.R.c. § 46(e)(3)(B) (1988). 
30. See supra note 28. 
31. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
32. I.R.C. § 46(e)(3) (1988). 
33. Congress intended that the ITC be limited to real investment and that there be a 
real business motive for a lease. H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted 
in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1843-44. 
[M]aking the credit available to the lessor is desirable, as a general rule. . . . 
Nevertheless, ... [the committee] is concerned about the extent to which individ­
uals (singly or as a group in a joint venture) are able to utilize the tax benefits of 
leasing transactions ... as a means to shelter from tax a substantial part of their 
other income. 
[d. 
34. See supra note 7 comparing the effect of corporate and partnership ownership of 
a company. 
35. Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985, 987 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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To ensure that those legitimate business lessors not falling within 
the test would not be fully denied the benefit of the lTC, Congress 
provided that the lessor may elect to pass the ITC through to the 
lessee. "Even though an individual lessor ... is denied the credit, he 
may still elect to pass it through to the lessee. In this manner the 
credit is not denied to the acquisition itself, but simply to the lessor."36 
This means that the lessor, denied the credit, can take pass-through of 
the credit into account when forming the lease. The credit is, in effect, 
sold along with the lease, and a lessee will theoretically pay a larger 
rental for lease of equipment that comes with an ITC. 
The following section explores the Commissioner's and taxpayers' 
arguments and the treatment provided the short-term lease test in the 
courts of appeals. Two courts of appeals' decisions37 are presented to 
show the conflict as to the interpretation of the short-term lease test. 
The issue is whether, in factually similar circumstances, the lease doc­
ument should be respected rather than application of sUbjective tests 
that cause the lease to be disregarded. 38 
36. H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3D, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1845. See also I.R.C. § 48(d) (1988). 
37. Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988); McNamara v. Commis­
sioner, 827 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1987). 
38. There is substantial precedent for disregarding the form of the lease in favor of 
the substance of the transaction. See Highland Hills Swimming Club, Inc. v. Wiseman, 272 
F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1959). In accord, G. W. Van Keppel CO. V. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 
767 (8th Cir. 1961); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.e. 640 (1975). 
In Highland Hills, the partnership taxpayer built a swimming pool and leased it to a related 
corporation which owned and managed an adjacent health club. The major issue in this 
case was whether stated terms in leases should be controlling for tax purposes when deter­
mining the depreciable life of the swimming pool. Highland Hills, 272 F.2d at 179. The 
court stated: "[I]n determining the character of any transaction or arrangement for tax 
purposes the substance rather than the form is controlling..... That leases or terms of 
leases may be disregarded under this principle is clear." Id. at 180. The court held that the 
lease was, in substance, of indefinite duration. Id. 
The result of this ruling was that the taxpayer's attempt to depreciate the property 
over the term of the lease was disallowed. "If the stated period of the lease is not recog­
nized and the lease is found to be of indefinite duration the improvement must be depreci­
ated over its useful life. " Id. at 179. Thus, the court required that the pool's cost of nearly 
$54,000 be amortized over its 20-year useful life rather than over the 100 month (8.33 year) 
term of the lease. Id. at 180. 
In Highland Hills the court considered four factors of particular importance in deter­
mining the lease to be of indefinite duration: "the relationship of the parties concerned; 
failure of the taxpayer to pay all of the rental; the fact that the swimming pool was an 
integral part of the club; and the cost of the improvements made by the taxpayer." Id. at 
179. Of these, the court perceived the relationship of the parties to the transaction or their 
common control as the major factor in assessing whether to ignore the stated term of the 
lease: 
[T]he fact· that the stockholders of the corporations involved are identical or re­
lated makes possible the continuation of the present lease arrangement as long as 
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II. INTERPRETING THE SHORT-TERM LEASE TEST 
Despite the criteria that the short-term lease test provides for ITC 
qualification for noncorporate lessors, the proper interpretation of the 
short-term lease test is unresolved. The statute provides in part that 
"the term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) ... [must 
be] less than 50 percent of the useful life of the property."39 The Com­
missioner and taxpayers take different positions as to what this lan­
guage means. In this dispute, the Commissioner contends that the 
substance of the leasing transaction is actually a lease of indefinite du­
ration. He argues that, despite the written terms of the lease, the par­
ties realistically contemplated that the lease would last beyond half of 
the property's useful life when the lease was made and such a transac­
tion does not qualify for the ITC within the terms of the statute.4O 
The taxpayers, by contrast, argue that because legitimate business pur­
poses support creation of a separate entity to serve as lessor to that 
entity's related companies and because obtaining a better tax result is 
not the primary motive behind formulation of the leasing transaction, 
the terms of their written leases, which comply with the short-term 
lease test, should be respected.41 The approaches taken by the Seventh 
and First Circuits to resolve this controversy over the interpretation of 
the short-term lease test differ radically, but illustrate the competing 
issues and concerns of the parties and of the courts. 
A. McNamara v. Commissioner42 
In McNamara, the non-corporate lessor claimed the ITC on its 
individual returns for the years 1977, 1978, and 1979 on the assump­
tion that they were in compliance with the conditions of I.R.C. Section 
46(e)(3)(B).43 The taxpayers formed a partnership, D & B Associates 
(D & B), in 1968,44 for the dual purpose of meeting their equipment 
needs without increasing liabilities and of diversifying their assets to 
better cope with the economic swings which affect the construction 
it is advantageous .... [This] has been borne out in practice .... And the continu­
ance as long as it is advantageous is, of course, characteristic of an indefinite lease. 
Id. at 180. 
39. I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B) (1988). See supra note 29 for the full text of the statute. 
40. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 169-70; Connor, 847 F.2d at 989. 
41. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172; Connor, 847 F.2d at 987. 
42. 827 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1987). 
43. Id. at 169. 
44. Donald G. McNamara and Robert F. Christiansen each owned a one-half inter­
est in the partnership. Both McNamara and Christiansen challenged disallowance of the 
ITC by the IRS. Amounts at issue are as follows: 
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business.45 D & B purchased the Section 38 property, took advantage 
of the lTC, and leased the property toa related corporation, F.J.A. 
Christiansen Roofing Co., Inc. (Roofing).46 The leases were for a fixed 
term, less than half the useful life of the property, and contained no 
option to renew. In addition, the parties renegotiated the leases47 for 
successive periods at different terms.48 
McNamara, Christiansen, 
1977 $2,804.00 $2,804.00 
1978 7,307.00 7,307.00 
1979 6,300.00 6,811.00 
McNamara v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1464 (1986). 
45. F.J.A. Christiansen: 
had a low net worth and limited working capital and was reluctant to incur addi­
tional indebtedness because the existence of excessive liabilities on its balance 
sheet would severely impede its ability to obtain bid bonds necessary to bid on 
construction projects. . . . 
[T]he taxpayers were also motivated by a desire to acquire some assets which 
would be insulated from the risks and seasonal swings of the construction busi­
ness.... [I]n addition ... D & B owns real estate which it leases to another 
related company and has invested in stock and in partnerships involved in oil and 
gas activities. 
McNamara, 827 F.2d at 169. 
46. 	 Stock ownership of F.J.A. Christiansen Roofing Co., Inc. was as follows: 
Nonvoting 
Votirig Class A Class B Com-
Stockholder Common Stock mon Stock Preferred Stock 
Donald McNamara 50 % 39% 0 

Robert F. Christiansen 33.8% 5% 0 

Christiansen Family Trust 16.2% 56% 0 

Joyce Church o 0 100% 

Totals 100 % 100% 100% 
McNamara, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1465. Thus 83.8% of the voting stock in the corporation 
(a controlling amount) is owned by Donald McNamara and Robert F. Christiansen, the 
partners of D & B Associates. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 169. 
47. See McNamara, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1465-67 for details of the lease provisions. 
Section 38 property at issue included: 
equipment 	 year of 
acquisition useful life 
1. Mack Truck 	 1977 8 years 
2. Toshiba Copier 	 1977 8 years 
3. Mack Truck 	 1978 5 years 
4. 	 35-ton P & H 1979 10 years 
hydraulic truck crane 
5. 25-ton Grove 	 1978 10 years 
hydraulic truck crane 
Id. at 1465-66. 
48. Stated lease terms were revised, the rental rates were reduced, allocation of ex­
penses between the parties was adjusted, and options to purchase were eliminated. McNa­
mara, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1465-67. 
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The Commissioner disallowed the ITC and assessed a deficiency. 
D & B argued to the Tax Court that the face of the written lease 
should be respected and the ITC allowed. In opposition, the Commis­
sioner argued the realistic contemplation test. He countered that there 
was a reasonable certainty that the lessor would continue to use the 
leased equipment beyond the stated term of the lease and that the 
leases were, in fact, of indefinite duration.49 The Tax Court accepted 
the Commissioner's argument and affirmed the disallow~nce of the 
ITC.50 D & B appealed the Tax Court decision. 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax 
Court's decision. The court held that where there are "legitimate eco­
nomic and business considerations" and where tax avoidance is not 
the primary motive behind the transactions, then short of the Com­
missioner showing the lease transaction to be a "sham," a lease docu­
ment satisfying the short-term lease test should be respected and the 
ITC allowed.51 Further, the court determined that, based on the writ­
ten terms of the lease, D & B retained the active business risks associ­
ated with the lease transaction. Such risks included the possibilities 
that the value of the equipment might decline, that the lessees might 
lose the continued ability to pay, and that the equipment might need 
to be re-Ieased. 52 
In rejecting the Commissioner's realistic contemplation test, the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed the legislative history of Section 46(e)(3)(B) 
and, without elaboration, noted that the Commissioner's real concern 
appeared to be evasion of taxes through common ownership of parties 
to lease transactions. 53 The court determined that Congress enacted 
Section 46(e)(3)(B) to prevent use of the ITC as a tax shelter for pas­
sive investors. To this end, the short-term lease test "is designed to 
ensure that the lessor bears much of the economic risk of the prop­
49. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 169-70. 
50. Evidence relied upon by the Tax Court included: 1) 0 & B's purchases were 
made specifically to meet the needs of Roofing; 2) Roofing's cost by leasing from 0 & B was 
less than if a third-party lessor were used; 3) there were no subsequent changes in the 
financial situation of Roofing allowing purchase of its own equipment; 4) 0 & B leased only 
to related parties; and 5) 0 & B and Roofing were commonly owned. McNamara, 827 
F.2d at 171, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1468-69. 
51. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172. 
52. Id. at 171. 
53. Id. at 172 n.5. The court further stated that Section 482 of the Internal Revenue 
Code gives the Commissioner authority to reallocate credits between commonly owned 
entities to prevent tax evasion or to clearly reflect income. But, the Commissioner has 
never used that power "to reallocate the investment tax credit in cases involving leasing 
transactions among related entities." Id. 
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erty."54 The court specifically rejected the Commissioner's realistic 
contemplation test: 
The fact that the lessor and lessee may realistically contemplate 
continuous renewal of a lease certainly cannot afford the lessor the 
same kind of protection [from economic risk] as a binding commit­
ment to renew on identical or essentially similar terms.[55] The 
principal economic risk associated with the ownership of rental 
property is the risk of a dramatic reduction in expected rental in­
come .... To insulate itself from this risk ... a lessor must enter 
into a long-term lease which obligates the lessee to pay a fixed 
amount of rent over the entire useful life of the property. Short of 
such an arrangement, the lessor will continue to bear at least some 
risk associated with ownership of the property. 56 
Thus, without some guarantee or expectation of renewal on the same 
or similar terms, even where the parties are commonly controlled or 
may have reasonably contemplated at the inception of the lease trans­
actions that the lease would be continuously renewed, the lessor re­
tains the· risks of ownership of the property. 
Based primarily on its assessment of congressional intent in en­
acting Section 46(e)(3)(B)-that emphasis be placed on retention of 
business risk where there are legitimate economic and business consid­
erations underlying the leasing transactions-the court concluded: 
At least in cases involving leasing activity that is not primarily tax 
motivated, where the stated lease term in a written lease document 
satisfies the 50 percent requirement, that document should be 
respected, and unless the Commissioner can demonstrate that the 
lease is a "sham," i. e., that there has been a real shifting of all eco­
nomic risk associated with the leased property from the lessor to the 
lessee, the lessor is entitled to claim an investment tax credit for the 
property . . . .57 
In further support of its contention that retention of risk be determina­
tive of a short-term lease transaction, the court provided that the 
54. Id. at 170. 
55. Leases containing a binding commitment to renew·on identical or substantially 
similar terms or containing options to renew may be aggregated. See Rev. Rul. 76-266, 
1976-2 C.B. 10, 11. This revenue ruling governs circumstances in which successive leases 
are aggregated and considered as one lease. Leases may be aggregated where either concur­
rent agreements to lease for successive periods which extend beyond 50% of the useful life 
of the property and/or options to renew are found. However, the rule favors not aggregat­
ing leases in which there is real negotiation of the terms of the new leases or retention by 
the lessor of some of the economic risk associated with the property. Id. 
56. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 171. 
57. Id. at 172. 
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Commissioner must show the lease to be effectively long-term. "[A]t 
minimum there must be a fixed intention that the lease will be continu­
ously renewed on the same or substantively identical terms" to prove 
the lease transaction is a "sham."58 
B. Connor v. Commissioner59 
In Connor, a case factually similar to McNamara, the First Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals followed the majority of the Tax Court deci­
sions60 in specifically disagreeing with the McNamara approach and 
accepting the Commissioner's argument that the realistic contempla­
tion test should be applied. As a result, the court determined that the 
lease transaction was, in substance, of indefinite duration and the tax­
payer was disallowed the ITC. 
In Connor, Sunset Construction Company (Sunset), a partner­
ship,61 was formed to buy and lease heavy construction equipment to 
two related companies.62 In 1979 and 1980, one of the partners, Eu­
gene R. Connor, claimed an ITC on his personal income tax retum63 
for the Section 38 property purchased for the purpose of leasing. The 
58. Id. The court vacated the decision of the Tax Court and remanded for the lim­
ited purpose of determining if any of the five leases were "shams" using the test given. On 
remand, the Tax Court determined that four of the five leases were not "shams." The fifth 
lease was also remanded for the purpose of determining if the 15% test of I.R.C. 
§ 46(e)(3)(B) was met. The court determined that the test was not met, obviating the ne­
cessity of reaching the issue of a "sham" for this one lease. McNamara v. Commissioner, 
55 T.C.M. (CCH) 401 (1988). 
59. Connor v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988). 
60. See supra note 16. 
61. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for an explanation of the effects of the 
partnership form of ownership. 
62. Ownership of Sunset Construction Company was in the form of a general part­
nership owned equally by Eugene R. Connor and his brother, John H. Connor III. The 
brothers were each 50% shareholders in the related companies, Connor Construction Cor­
poration (Connor Co.) and Catamount Construction Corporation (Catamount). Connor v. 
Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 724, 725 (1987). "In 1979, Sunset purchased 19 pieces of 
equipment at a total cost of $604,478. In 1980, Sunset purchased additional equipment at a 
total cost of $115,022." Id. at 726. The Section 38 property purchased was primarily 
heavy construction equipment. Smaller pieces of equipment were generally purchased di­
rectly by Connor Co. and Catamount. Id. at 725-26. 
63. Eugene R. Connor and his wife, Mary P. Connor, filed joint tax returns for the 
years in question. The Investment Tax Credits claimed on the Connors' tax returns are as 
follows: 
Year Deficiency 
1976 $ 7,669.00 
1977 1,013.82 
1978 11,872.18 
1979 7,147.80 
1980 4,781.00 
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Commissioner disallowed the lTC, arguing that it was reasonably cer­
tain that the leases would last far longer than the stated term resulting 
in noncompliance64 with the short-term lease test. 65 The taxpayer 
countered, arguing that the terms of the written leases should be 
respected. The Tax Court accepted the Commissioner's realistic con­
templation argument, determined the leases to be in substance of in­
definite duration,66 and affirmed disallowance of the ITC. Connor 
appealed the decision of the Tax Court to the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Connor affirmed 
the Tax Court decision. The court approached its analysis of the 
short-term lease test by first reviewing the decision reached in McNa­
mara. The court determined that under the McNamara test67 the tax­
payer would prevail because, as conceded by the Commissioner, 
Connor's motives for entering into the leasing transactions were valid 
business reasons and not part of a tax avoidance scheme.68 However, 
the court disagreed both with the taxpayer's arguments and with the 
McNamara court's interpretation of the short-term lease test. The 
court gave four reasons for its disagreement with the McNamara deci­
sion: statutory analysis; purpose of the statute; administerability of the 
tax code; and deference to the Commissioner's interpretation of the 
Id. at 724-25. Only the leases and corresponding tax credits for the years 1979 and 1980 
were at issue. These totaled $11,928.80 in value. Id. at 726. 
64. The written term of the lease was one year; however, the Commissioner found 
that the leases were actually for a longer period exceeding half the useful life of the prop­
erty. Connor, 847 F.2d at 986. 
65. See supra note 29 for the text of I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B). 
66. Connor, 847 F.2d at 986. 
67. Id. at 987. 
68. The Connor brothers formed Sunset for two reasons. First, they wanted to avoid 
being cited for unfair labor practices. The Connors' other two companies, Connor Con­
struction Corp. and Catamount Construction Corp., were respectively unionized and non-
unionized: Q 
The simultaneous operation of a union and a non-union construction com­
pany, both of which are under common ownership, is referred to as a "double­
breasted" operation. Failure to operate the two companies as separate, distinct 
entities can result in a finding ... [of] an unfair labor practice. 
Inter-company loans and the rental of equipment back and forth between 
Connor Construction and Catamount might have raised questions over whether 
the double-breasted operations were separate and distinct. 
Connor, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 725. Second, bid bonds are commonly required for contrac­
tors doing public construction work. Moving fixed assets to the financial statements of 
Sunset correspondingly removed them from the financial statements of the related compa­
nies making those companies appear more liquid and improving their ability to acquire bid 
bonds. Id. . 
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tax code.69 
In Connor, the court interpreted the McNamara decision as call­
ing for a strong presumption in favor of a written lease, as requiring an 
examination of the motives of the lessor and lessee on a case-by-case 
basis, and as shifting the burden of proof to the Commissioner in con­
travention of IRS Rules of Practice and Procedure.70 The court stated 
the McNamara test as follows: 
In McNamara, the court interpreted [Section] 46(e)(3)(B) as requir­
ing the Commissioner to accept at face value "the stated lease term 
in a written lease," at least where (1) the "leasing activity ... is not 
primarily tax motivated" and (2) the Commissioner can [not] 
demonstrate that the lease is a "sham," i.e., that there has been a 
real shifting of all economic risk associated with the leased property 
from the lessor to the lessee. 71 
The Connor court stated that the language of the statute does not on 
its face require a McNamara test or any other test72 and, moreover, 
that "the statute's purposes do not seem to call for the strong 'written 
lease' presumption that the [McNamara court] has erected."73 
In Connor, the court further viewed McNamara as requiring that 
the Commissioner demonstrate the transaction to be a "sham" by di­
recting that "the Commissioner or the courts ... examine the motives 
of the lessor/purchaser . . . to decide whether, on all the facts, the 
lessor/purchaser was a legitimate business ...."74 Connor rejected 
this subjective approach in favor of its own interpretation of congres­
sional intent, that is, establishment of what the court termed an "ob­
69. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987-89. The court focused on evidence showing that the 
related companies were likely to receive one of the many jobs that they bid upon where the 
leased equipment would be used. The companies were closely related, and Sunset was cre­
ated specifically to meet the needs of the lessees. There were no past rentals or sales to 
third parties, and the lessees leased from third party lessors only after Sunset's business 
decision not to meet the lessee's needs through purchase of the equipment to lease to the 
related companies. Id. at 991. 
70. Id. at 987-88. IRS Rules of Practice and Procedure are public statements of 
internal practices and procedures. S. SURREY, supra note 12, at 21. 
71. Connor, at 987 (quoting McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172). 
72. In fact, the language of the statute says simply that "the term of the lease (taking 
into account options to renew) ... [must be] less than 50 percent of the useful life of the 
property." I.R.e. § 46(e)(3)(8) (1988). See supra note 29 for the full text of the statute. 
Thus, the Connor court analyzed the statute concluding that the language of the stat­
ute does not require any specific test because the words "term" and "offer to renew" are not 
specifically defined in the statute. The manner in which these may be shown is left to the 
court's interpretation. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987. 
73. [d. 
74. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987 (citing Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.e. 86i,' 872 (1981) 
("hard and fast" test adopted by Congress for determining eligibility». 
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jective test" based on the length of the lease as determined by the 
realistic contemplation test. The court stated that the purpose of the 
statute was to. discourage passive investment by "persons not genu­
inely in the leasing business, say, partnerships of doctors, or lawyers, 
or dentists, to obtain for themselves the benefits of the ITC"75 thereby 
sheltering other income from tax. Instead, Congress chose to en­
courage real investment by firms in fact in the leasing business.76 To 
that end, Congress enacted the short-term lease test which the court 
determined was designed to focus on the nature of the lease, rather 
than on the underlying motives of the lessor or the lessee.77 In the 
court's view, the short-term lease test established objective criteria 
based on "lease-life."78 
As further support for its contention that Congress did not intend 
examination of the motives of the lessor and lessee on a case-by-case 
basis, the court pointed out that Congress recognized that there would 
be legitimate professional lessors who would not meet the test.79 To 
accommodate those lessors and to preempt case-by-case analysis, Con­
gress "permit[ted] a disqualified lessor ... to pass on the ITC to the 
leasing firm, which can then itself use the credit."80 
Further, the court held the McNamara test too difficult to admin­
ister for two reasons. 8l First, the test requires examination of the les­
sor's motives on a case-by-case basis. Second, the test shifts the 
burden of proof to the Commissioner if there is a written lease comply­
ing on its face with the short-term lease test and no tax avoidance 
motive is found. The court stated that "Congress ... [wrote] a general 
rule based on the length of the lease, [and did] not ... order case-by­
case risk assessment. "82 This general rule is easier to administer be­
cause making the written lease determinative of the term of the lease 
can allow manipulation83 by the parties, especially where the parties 
are commonly controlled,84 because the lessor controls the amount of 
75. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
76. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987. 
77. Id. at 988. 
78. Id. at 987. 
79. Id. at 988. 
80. Id. See supra note 36 (I.R.C. § 48(d) (1988) allows the lessor to pass the ITC on 
to the lessee). 
81. Connor, 847 F.2d at 988.. 
82. Id. 
83. '~If a lessor has complete control of a lessee, the 'risk' it chooses to shift is also 
under its control. It can draft either long-term, or short-term, leases to impose risks in a 
host of different ways, all without changing their duration." Id" 
84. The Connor court is especially concerned here because the subject written leases 
were executed after the fact on the advice of an accountant. Id. 
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risk that it shifts- to the lessee.8s 
Further, on the issue of administerability, the court stated that 
shifting the burden of proof to the Commissioner as provided in the 
McNamara test86 goes against the IRS's procedural rules. Discussing 
burden of proof requirements, the court stated: 
[A]llowing the Commissioner to prove that a lease is a sham ... 
means that, given a lease with the right language, the Commissioner 
rather than the taxpayer effectively bears the burden of proof. The 
Commissioner must demonstrate that the lease is a sham, presuma­
bly by using many of the same factors that the taxpayer previously 
had to use to show his or her "realistic contemplation." This result 
cuts against the spirit of Rule 142(a).87 
Finally, the Connor court gave deference to the Commissioner's 
interpretation of the short-term lease test for two reasons.88 First, the 
court recognized the Commissioner's expertise in interpreting the 
complex statutory provisions of the tax law. Second, the court stated 
that consistent interpretation of a statute is entitled to the court's re­
spect. Thus, the Connor court paid deference to the Commissioner's 
interpretation of the statute and applied his realistic contemplation 
test: "the taxpayer must show that the parties, when they made the 
lease, 'realistic[ally] contempl[ated)' that the lease would cover less 
than 50 percent of the property's usefullife."89 The court determined 
that the Connors' failed to meet this test and that the leases were actu­
ally of indefinite duration. Thus, the court disallowed the ITC. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The First and Seventh Circuits' approaches to the interpretation 
of the short-term lease test are quite different. This section analyzes 
these conflicting interpretations, discussing the statutory language and 
congressional intent, application of the short-term lease test in those 
transactions where the taxpayer has common ownership or control of 
the lessor and lessee, and the subjective versus objective nature of the 
proffered tests. This section also explores the concept of deference to 
the IRS administrative agency and discusses why the court in Connor, 
85. [d. 
86. [d. (citing McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172). 
87. [d. at 988. "Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, 26 U.S.c. foil. § 7453 
[(1982)] (taxpayer bears burden of proof in protesting deficiency assessed by Commis­
sioner)." [d. 
88. [d. at 989. 
89. [d. (citing Hokanson v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984); Rid­
der v. Commissioner, 76 T.c. 867, 875 (1981». 
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based on accepted standards for deference, was incorrect in deferring 
to the Commissioner's interpretation of the short-term lease test. This 
section concludes with a discussion of the interpretation of the short­
term lease test which best effectuates the intent of Congress. 
A. Comparison of the McNamara and Connor Decisions 
The McNamara and Connor decisions agree in two important re­
spects. First, both courts agree that the congressional purpose of the 
ITC was to discourage passive investors from using the ITC and, con­
versely, to encourage active investment by non-corporate lessors.9o 
Thus, to benefit from the lTC, Congress required that non-corporate 
lessors lease the Section 38 property for less than half of its useful 
life.91 Second, pursuant to the McNamara rationale, the taxpayers in 
both cases would be allowed to take the ITC.92 
In contrast, the courts' opinions diverge strongly in interpreting 
and applying the intent of Congress. The McNamara court inter­
preted this purpose as a requirement that the lessor bear the economic 
risk of the transaction93 and required the Commissioner to show the 
transaction to be a "sham."94 The Connor court interpreted the con­
gressional objective as discouragement of passive investment by those 
"not genuinely in the leasing business"95 and applied its objective test 
based upon the actual length of the lease.96 The courts further dis­
agreed on the importance of common control in applying the short­
term lease test and on the degree of deference owed the Commis­
sioner's interpretation.97 
The language of a statute is the first place a court should look in 
determining whether an interpretation is appropriate. It is a well es­
tablished canon of statutory interpretation that where the words of the 
statute are clear they should be applied as written.98 The statute calls 
90. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 170; Connor, 847 F.2d at 987. 
91. "[T]he term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) ... [must be] less 
than 50 percent of the useful life of the property." I.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B) (1988). See supra 
note 29 for the full text of the statute. 
92. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172; Connor, 847 F.2d at 987. 
93. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
94. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
95. Connor, 847 F.2d at 987. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
97. See infra notes 123-55 and accompanying text for analysis of the issue of defer­
ence to an administrative agency (the IRS) when interpreting the short-term lease test. 
98. T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETA­
TION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 195 (2d ed. 1874) 
(quoting the United States Supreme Court in Fisher v. Blight, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 399 
(1805): "Where a law is plain and unambiguous ... the legislature should be intended to 
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simply for a lease which extends for less than half of the useful life of 
the leased property. This is an objective standard which appears to 
look only to the lease document. "Congress thus chose reasonably 
clear requirements upon which the taxpayer, the [IRS], and the courts 
could rely in determining the propriety of a lessor's retention of the 
credit.... Although the rule [Section 46(e)(3)(B)] was initially inter­
preted by the courts and the [IRS] fairly literally [ ] current interpreta­
tions have superimposed sUbjective criteria on it ...."99 Thus, as a 
threshold, there must exist a written lease document which complies 
with the statute. 
The next source in interpreting a statute is the legislative history. 
"Congressional meaning is of course ordinarily to be discerned in the 
words Congress uses. But when the literal application of the imprecise 
words ... Congress employed ... produces ... extraordinary results 
. . . we should determine whether this meaning is confirmed in the 
legislative history of the section."loo The issue is whether application 
of the Commissioner's realistic contemplation test effectuates the con­
gresional intent to discourage passive investors from availing them­
selves of the ITC. Congress intended that the ITC be limited to real 
investment and that there be a real business motive101 for a lease: 
[M]aking the credit available to the lessor is desirable, as a general 
rule.... Nevertheless, ... [the committee] is concerned about the 
extent to which individuals (singly or as a group in a joint venture) 
are able to utilize the tax benefits of leasing transactions . . . as a 
means to shelter from tax a substantial part of their other 
income. 102 
In Connor, the court justified acceptance of the Commissioner's 
realistic contemplation test by stating that where entities are com­
monly controlled there is greater opportunity for manipulating a 
mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for 
construction. "). 
99. Vitale, Note-Noncorporate Lessors' Retention of the Investment Tax Credit Fol­
lowing Recent Judicial Interpretations of Section 46(e)(3)(B), 37 TAX LAW. 187, 190-91 
(1984) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter VITALE]. This note focused on early, 1980-1982, 
Tax Court decisions concerning I.R.e. § 46(e)(3)(B) from a tax planning perspective. The 
author discussed Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.e. 867, 872 (1981), where the Tax Court 
upheld the lease document and chose not to interfere with the congressional choice of 
"hard and fast" tests for retention of the ITC. Id. 
100. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 184 (1967). 
101. H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1825, 1843-44. 
102. Id. 
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transaction to fit within the strictures of the Code.103 Congress does 
not address common control of a lessor and lessee directly in the 
wording of the statute, nor indirectly in the congressional history. 
However, common control of the lessor and lessee is a factor in the 
majority of the Tax Court cases and in the courts of appeals cases 
discussed in this comment that litigate the validity of non-corporate 
lessors taking an ITC. Both the McNamara and Connor courts dis­
cuss the lessor and lessee as commonly controlled entities. The McNa­
mara court addresses common control directly stating that, in fact, the 
Commissioner's real concern in these cases is the common control 
factor. 104 
The Commissioner's argument for the realistic contemplation test 
was rejected in a recent Tax Court case, Sauey v. Commissioner, lOS 
where the Tax Court changed its approach to the short-term lease 
test. 106 In Sauey, the taxpayer partnership purchased and leased two 
successively owned airplanes to its related corporation. The Commis­
sioner sought to aggregate the leases for both airplanes and deny the 
ITC of $133,902 taken in 1981. While generally supporting the 
McNamara court's approach, the Sauey court reexamined burden of 
proof and evidence issues and stated that the taxpayers must bear the 
burden of proof as to whether the lease is short-term. This require­
ment is met by showing a short-term lease of fixed duration with no 
options to renew. The burden of proof then shifts to the 
Commissioner. 107 
Departing from both the Connor and McNamara approaches, the 
court in Sauey stated that the Commissioner may meet the burden of 
proof by arguing reasonable certainty and producing further evidence 
that the leases were of indefinite duration. 108 The additional evidence 
required included, for example, automatic renewal of leases on the 
same terms with no negotiation, purchase and resale of leased equip­
ment to satisfy the needs of the related party, and evidence that the 
transaction was formed primarily for tax purposes. 109 The Sauey 
court concluded by stating: 
[The Commissioner's] real concern in this case appears to be that 
103. Connor; 847 F.2d at 988. 
104. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172 n.5. 
105. 90 T.C. 824 (1988). Accord Borchers v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1469 
(1988) (but noting the Connor court's disagreement). 
106. Sauey, 90 T.C. at 827-28. 
107. Id. at 827. 
108. Id. at 829-30. 
109. Id. at 828-30: 
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. . . [the lessor and lessee] are related parties. We recognize that in 
leasing transactions involving related parties there is a clear poten­
tial for abuse. However, Congress did not see fit to deny the invest­
ment credit to noncorporate lessors who are related to their lessees, 
even though it easily could have done so .... Rather, Congress 
simply imposed two hard-and-fast tests ... [the two-prong test of 
Section 46(e)(3)(B)], and provided that all noncorporate lessors of 
property eligible for the investment credit are entitled to the credit if 
they satisfy these two tests. I 10 
The Commissioner closely scrutinized common control of the les­
sor and the lessee or related party transactions for compliance with the 
short-term lease test. I II There is an implied aura of suspicion that by 
employing· related business entities, a taxpayer is actually employing 
tax evasion techniques. This premise ignores the fact that tax law does 
not preclude formation of a business with awareness of the tax 
structure. 112 
If, as stated in both McNamara and Sauey, the Commissioner's 
real concern in these cases is common control of the lessor and the 
lessee, it follows that acceptance of the Commissioner's realistic con­
templation test in Connor may be justified as a means of preventing 
these entities from improperly manipulating the short-term lease test 
because the realistic contemplation test can be applied broadly to dis­
allow all such related party transactions. Thus, in effect, the Commis­
sioner is targeting these entities for using the ITC as a conduit to 
shelter other income from tax, clearly a forbidden use of the ITC ac- . 
cording to congressional intent. The problem with using the short­
term lease test in this manner is that Congress did not intend to forbid 
the ITC to these lessors.1I3 Congress had the ability to limit use of the 
110. ld. at 829. 
III. Close scrutiny takes the form of court review of a number of variables to assess 
whether the transaction has the components of arms length dealing. For example, in Con­
nor, the court looked for leasing transactions conducted with outside or third parties by the 
lessor, the lessee seeking alternative leasing arrangements, lessor purchase of equipment 
specifically for the needs of the lessee and resale of equipment motivated solely by the needs 
of the lessee. Connor, 847 F.2d at 990. 
112. Sauey, 90 T.C. at 829. "To be sure, we have no doubt that ... [Sauey] was 
aware of the tax consequences of his leasing activities. However, we have never held that 
persons engaged in business activities must be ignorant of the tax benefits resulting from 
those activities in order to be eligible for such benefits." ld. See generally Dosart, Tax 
court raises section 46(e)(3) hurdle for non-corporate lessors attempting to claim lTC, 58 J. 
TAX'N 100 (1983) (observing in a factually similar case, Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 
T.C.M. (CCH) 674 (1982), see supra note 16: "[t]he fact pattern here suggests too strongly 
a tax savings motivation .... The Tax Court seems to overlook the fact that all good 
business deals involve a perceived benefit by both parties to the deal.") ld. at 102. 
113. Sauey, 90 T.C. at 829. 
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ITC to leasing transactions between independently controlled non-cor­
porate entities. In fact, Congress chose not to do so. 
As further evidence that Congress did not intend that the short­
term lease test be used, beyond its scope, as a weapon against tax shel­
ters formed by commonly controlled entities, Congress has enacted 
statutes which specifically address the issue of abusive tax shelters.'14 
These are the tools which Congress has provided to the Commissioner 
to disallow such shelters. For example, I.R.C. Section 482 "authorizes 
the. Commissioner to reallocate credits between '... businesses .. '. 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests' if nec­
essary to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect income." 1 15 
In addition, the tests created by both Connor and McNamara re­
quire imposition of a sUbjective case-by-case analysis of the facts. In 
McNamara, the court formulates its own test which first accepts the 
lease on its face, but then emphasizes a determination, with the Com­
missioner bearing the burden of proof, as to whether the lessor is actu­
ally in the business of leasing. This is ascertained by analyzing 
whether the lessor has retained the economic risk associated with the 
transaction. 116 The Connor court terms the McNamara approach sub­
jective because it requires review of the lessor's motives in each case. 
The Connor court finds particular fault, from both a deference and 
administrative convenience point of view,_ with the McNamara re­
quirement that the burden of proof shift to the Commissioner once 
economic risk is established."7 Further, the Connor court finds no 
specific test embodied in the statute, and so, in deference to the Com­
missioner, opts for his interpretation which is the realistic contempla­
tion test. liB The Commissioner's realistic contemplation test requires 
that "the taxpayer ... show that the parties, when they made the 
lease, 'realistic[ally] contempl[ated]' that the lease would cover less 
than 50 percent of the property's useful life." 1 19 
Although on a superficial level the realistic contemplation test ap­
pears to be objective, it is defective because in application, the test as 
used in Connor requires a case-by-case analysis, as does the McNa­
mara court's motive analysis test. For that reason, Connor does not 
provide an administratively easier solution. Examining either contem­
plation by the taxpayer or his motives involves determining what the 
114. I.R.C. § 482 (1988). See also McNamara, 827 F.2d at 172 n.5. 
115. I.R.C. § 482 (1988). 
116. McNamara, 827 F.2d at 171-72. 
117. Connor, 847 F.2d at 988-89. 
118. Id. at 989. See supra notes 73-78, 88-89 and accompanying text. 
119. Connor, 847 F.2d at 989. 
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taxpayer was considering when making the lease; a far departure from 
the clear wording of the statute or the intent of Congress. Contempla­
tion is defined as "an act of the mind in considering with attention ... 
the act of intending or considering a future event."120 A motive is 
"the consideration or object influencing a choice or prompting an ac­
tion."121 Examining the leasing transaction after the fact is sUbjective 
because the same evidence is used by the Commissioner to prove non­
compliance with the short-term lease as by the taxpayer to show com­
pliance. The evidence is subjective because, as mustered by the IRS, it 
may be molded to fit the test. Indeed, it would be difficult for the 
honest taxpayer, who intended and created a short-term lease, to rebut 
the government's conclusory evidence that the parties realistically 
contemplated a long-term arrangement when that lease, by circum­
stance alone, became long-term. 
In sum, Congress provided a clearly worded objective two-part 
test for determining a valid lease. Although the McNamara test comes 
close to effectuating congressional intent because the court first ac­
cepts the written lease and then the Commissioner must prove the 
transaction is a "sham," the further requirement that each leasing 
transaction be examined for the appropriate retention of economic risk 
by the lessor goes beyond the scope of the statute. The difficulty lies in 
fashioning a test which allows the honest noncorporate lessor to take 
advantage of the ITC as Congress provided. The approach taken by 
the Sauey court best reflects the intent of Congress and strikes a work­
able balance between Connor and McNamara. In Sauey, the court di­
rects that all non-corporate lessors are eligible for the ITC if the 
transaction satisfies the two-pronged test of the statute, but requires 
further evidence to show the lease is a legitimate business transac­
tion. 122 This means that in a case where a short-term lease, by busi­
ness circumstance alone, becomes long-term, the taxpayer is given an 
opportunity to rebut the Commissioner's conclusory evidence that a 
long-term arrangement was intended from the inception of the lease. 
The realistic contemplation test, even if used to prevent. shelter of 
other income by commonly controlled entities, should be rejected as 
an overly broad application of the statute that reaches beyond the 
scope of the statute and its congressional history. The Connor court 
also posited that deference is due to the Commissioner's interpretation 
of the short-term lease test. As discussed in the following section, this 
120. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 491 (3d ed. 1976). 
121. Id. at 1475. 
122. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
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rationale for sustaining the Commissioner's realistic contemplation 
test is unwarranted. 
B. The Deference Issue: Concepts and Cases 
This section explores the issue of deference to the Commissioner's 
interpretation of the short-term lease test by describing the rationale 
for deference to administrative agencies and by analyzing the pertinent 
case law on judicial deference to the Commissioner's interpretation of 
the Internal Revenue Code. The Commissioner's interpretation of the 
short-term lease test, calculated to disallow the lTC, has varied over 
time. Cases illustrating these varied interpretations are presented. 
There are several criteria to which the courts look in determining 
the degree of deference to accord an agency interpretation of a statute. 
These include: the congressional intent as to the discretion to be af­
forded that agency; the superior knowledge or degree of expertise in 
the agency; and the limits on the court's power to effectuate policy 
decisions because those decisions are ultimately within the agency's 
jurisdiction. 123 The Commissioner has traditionally been afforded a 
great degree of deference from the judiciary because of the complexity 
of the Internal Revenue Code and the expertise and understanding of 
the code as a whole needed for proper interpretation of the various 
sections. 124 
In Bob Jones University v. United States,125 the United States 
Supreme Court recognized the broad power vested by Congress in the 
Commissioner to administer and interpret the tax laws. 126 The Court 
stated, "Ever since the inception of the Tax Code, Congress has seen 
fit to vest in those administering the tax laws very broad authority to 
interpret those laws .... [C]ongress expressly authorized the Commis­
sioner 'to make all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement' 
of the tax laws." 127 Applying this principle, the Court in Jewett v. 
Commissioner 128 deferred to the Commissioner's viewpoint when the 
123. R. PIERCE, JR., S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUlL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO­
CESS, § 7.1, at 351-52 (1985) [hereinafter R. PIERCE, JR.]. 
124. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 224 (1984); Bob Jones Univer­
sity v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1983); Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 
318 (1982). 
125. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (United States Supreme Court found Commissioner's de­
nial of tax-exempt status to a private school, based on that school's practice of racial dis­
crimination, to be a policy determination within the Commissioner's power). 
126. Id. at 596-97. 
127. Id. at 596. 
128. 455 U.S. 305 (1982) (determination of the meaning of "transfer" as applied to 
testamentary transfers for federal gift tax purposes). 
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positions of both the taxpayer and the Commissioner found support in 
the code. 
The purpose of judicial review of agency action is to confine such 
action within the boundaries or limits set by Congress in the pertinent 
legislation. I29 Thus, as a threshold, the agency's action must be con­
sistent with the policies of the legislature for the courts to find in favor 
of the agency.130 In addition to statutory interpretation that is consis­
tent with the intent of Congress, consistency refers to agency uniform­
ity in interpretation of a statute. By reqUlnng consistent 
interpretations, the courts ensure that the public is provided notice as 
to permissible conduct concerning matters within the agency's juris­
diction. Thus, "[r]eviewing courts ... search for (1) internal consis­
tency and rationality in the agency's reasoning process; (2) 
interdecisional consistency ... similar cases being resolved in a similar 
manner; and, (3) intertemporal consistency ... the agency applying 
the same decisional standards over time." 13 I The rationality concept 
also focuses on the Commissioner's application of the statute and re­
quires that the agency decision be nondiscriminatory. The agency 
must consider all relevant factors prior to making its decision and 
avoid "making its decisions in a discriminatory manner based on the 
personal . . . characteristics of the parties affected by the agency's 
action." 132 
In Jewett, the Court afforded respect to the Commissioner's inter­
pretation of the tax code because this interpretation was consistent 
over a fifty year period. 133 By contrast, in Commissioner v. Engle, 134 
the Court refused to defer to the Commissioner's interpretation of the 
tax code.135 While recognizing that the Commissioner is generally af­
129. R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 123, § 5.1.4, at 124. 
130. [d. § 7.1, at 350 ("[a]n agency's action is consistent with the policy decisions of 
Congress only if the agency's action is based on an accurate determination of legislative 
intent and an accurate determination of the factual predicates for the agency's action"). [d. 
131. [d. § 5.1.5, at 127. 
132. [d. § 7.1, at 353. 
133. Jewett, 455 U.S. at 311-12, 318. "Both positions find support in the language'of 
the Regulation." [d. at 311. "Because that text is not entirely clear, however, it is appro­
priate to examine briefly the Regulation's history." [d. at 312. "The Commissioner's inter­
pretation of the Regulation has been consistent over the years and is entitled to respect." 
[d. at 318. 
134. 464 U.S. 206 (1984) (taxpayers challenged the Commissioner'S interpretation 
which disallowed depletion allowances for oil and gas reserves). 
135. In addition to arguing for deference, the Commissioner argued that his interpre­
tation provided greater administrative convenience. The Court dismissed the Commis­
sioner's administrative convenience argument stating, "[e]liminating the allowance [for 
depletion of gas and oil reserves] might make the statute 'simpler to administer,' ... but it 
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forded a high degree of deference, the Court applied a standard of 
reasonableness to the Commissioner's interpretation. Using the stan­
dard of reasonableness as measured against the congressional history 
of the statute,136 the Court found the Commissioner's interpretation 
unreasonable and inconsistent with congressional intent. 
When interpreting the short-term lease test, the Commissioner in­
vokes a variety of conflicting tests to disallow the ITC and alters his 
arguments according to the facts of the case. The Commissioner's his­
tory of inconsistent interpretation of the statute calls into question the 
propriety of judicial deference to the Commissioner's interpretations. 
Additionally, the Commissioner has suggested another test, the "trade 
or business" test,137 which the Tax Court rejected. 
Stewart IV v. U.S.A. 138 presented an issue analogous to the short­
term lease test. To qualify for an lTC, the lessor was required to prove 
that its leases to a governmental body, the Post Office, were short­
term. 139 The leases as written were short-term, but allowed for auto­
. matic renewal unless cancelled. 140 Taking an approach similar to that 
in the Connor case, the Commissioner argued that the actual length of 
the rental rather than the term of the lease should control. 141 The 
taxpayer argued that the district court should enforce the six month 
legal minimum term of the lease, making it a short-term lease, because 
there· was no assurance that the lease would extend beyond that pe­
riod. 142 The district court held for the Commissioner stating that "the 
controlling question is the duration of the actual use rather than the 
does so by ignoring the language of the statute, the views of those who sought its enact­
ment, and the purpose they articulated." Id. at 227. 
136. Id. at 220, 224. "[T]he true meaning of a single section of a statute in a setting 
as complex as that of the revenue acts, however precise its language, cannot be ascertained 
if it be considered apart from related sections, or if the mind be isolated from the history of 
the income tax legislation of which it is an integral part." Id. at 223 (quoting Helvering v. 
Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934». 
137. Miller v. Commissioner, 85 T.e. 1064 (1985). See infra notes 148-52 and ac­
companying text. 
138. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9648 (D. Neb. 1977). 
139. I.R.C. § 48(a)(5) (1954). 
140. The terms of the lease were: 
The term of all contracts extended from the date of delivery to the end of the 
fiscal year. The contracts were automatically renewable for up to three fiscal 
years unless sooner cancelled. Either party to the contract had the option to 
cancel the contract after six months by giving thirty days' written notice. During 
any renewal period following the end of the fiscal year in which the contract was 
negotiated, either party could cancel on one day's notice. 

Stewart IV, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9648 at 88,176. 

141. . ld. at 88,177. 
142. Id. at 88,175-76. 
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term of any single lease, since the leases were subject to automatic 
renewal unless the parties took affirmative action."143 
In Hoisington v. Commissioner,l44 the lessor partnership was cre­
ated to purchase and lease to drivers refrigerated freight trucks then 
owned by a related corporation to encourage driver ownership of the 
vehicles. The lessees invoked early cancellation clauses in accordance 
with the terms of their long-term leases. 145 As a result, the actual du­
ration of the leases was short-term. The taxpayers claimed that under 
these facts; their property should qualify for the ITC. In Hoisington, 
the Commissioner abandoned the realistic contemplation test ad­
vanced in Connor, instead arguing that the ITC should be disallowed 
on the basis of the terms stated within the written lease. The taxpay­
ers argued that the substance of the transaction should be determina­
tive of compliance with the short-term lease test. 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the 
Commissioner's argument that the term fixed within the long-term 
lease should be determinative,146 stating that "[s]ubstance over form is 
a doctrine which should be resorted to sparingly. It is not a wholesale 
license to dismantle and reform transactions by hindsight to achieve a 
certain tax result. In general, bona fide contracts ought to be 
respected." 147 
In Miller v. Commissioner,148 to disallow the lTC, the Commis­
143. Id. at 88,177. 
144. 833 F.2d 1398 (10th Cir. 1987). Graves Trucklines, Inc. (GTI) created a part­
nership, Power Leasing Associates (PLA), to effectuate the purchase and lease of refriger­
ated trucks to driver-employees ofGTI. PLA was the lessor and the driver-employees were 
the lessees. The lessee and lessor were not commonly controlled; however, the degree to 
which this transaction was at arms-length is debatable. Id. at 1399-1402. 
145. The leases allowed early cancellation so that drivers, not opting to own their 
vehicles after a trial period, could retain their status as members of the Teamsters Union. 
Id. at 1401. "Cancellation of the leases was permitted on thirty days notice, and fourteen 
of the leases cancelled within ... [the strictures of the short-term lease test]." Id. at 1399. 
146. Id. at 1405-06. "[N]o court has yet held that the ... [reasonable contemplation] 
test is appropriate for reducing the fixed term of a lease .... [W]e reject the argument that 
the taxpayers' reasonable contemplation of early cancellation overrides the actual agree­
ment as to the fixed lease term. Just as in substance versus form, the written agreement of 
the parties also expresses their contemplation with respect to the lease...." Id. at 1406. 
147. Id. at 1405. The court elaborated stating: 
Further, the doctrine is not the exclusive province of the government. However, 
the problem with the taxpayers' invocation of substance over form is that they are 
faced with the dilemma of repUdiating their own transaction expressed in terms of 
their own choosing. Especially in circumstances where the agreement is adverse 
to the interest of the drafter, the original written version is the substance, and the 
drafter is essentially estopped from denying that point. 
Id. 
148. 85 T.e. 1064 (1985) (partnership obtained recourse financing from an unrelated 
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sioner proposed that, in addition to the two-pronged test of Section 
46(e)(3)(B), 149 which included the short-term lease test, the Tax Court 
should apply a trade or business test. That test required that "the 
noncorporate lessor independently ... establish that he was engaged in 
the trade or business of leasing and that the particular lease in ques­
tion was a part of that trade or business."150 The Commissioner ar­
gued that this test would ensure compliance with the specific 
legislative intent of the short-term lease test because the ITC would be 
denied where leasing transactions were used as devices to shelter other 
income from tax.15I The Tax Court held against the Commissioner, 
allowed the lTC, and held that the statute required and Congress in­
tended only compliance with the two-pronged test. 152 
Thus, the Commissioner has invoked a variety of interpretations 
of the short-term lease test to disallow the ITC. As stated in Hois­
ington,153 "the government has been on all sides of the issue [of which 
test applies], depending on the advantage to be gained."ls4 This lack 
of uniformity in interpreting the code supports the McNamara court's 
decision not to defer to the Commissioner. The Connor court improp­
erly deferred to the Commissioner because deference to an administra­
tive agency's interpretation is not warranted when that interpretation 
has not been uniform over time. ISS 
The Connor decision fails first because acceptance of the Commis­
sioner's realistic contemplation test contravenes the intent of Con­
gress. Second, the decision fails because judicial deference to the 
Commissioner's interpretation is improper. The McNamara test more 
closely parallels congressional intent because the court initially accepts 
the written lease. But then McNamara goes too far and applies its 
party to purchase Section 38 property, a crane costing $451,225.00, for lease to its related 
corporation. Use of the ITC generated deficiencies of $90,496.(0). Id. at 1065-66. See 
contra Niagara County Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 51 (1984) (ITC 
denied where lease of Section 38 property by partnership to related corporation found to be 
a financing device only. The Tax Court found that there was no good faith business pur­
pose for the lease and no evidence that the partnership performed business functions other 
than holding title.)._ 
149. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 

ISO. Miller, 85 T.C. at 1070. 

151. Id. 
152. Id. at 1073-75. The Tax Court also held that even if the Commissioner's argu­
ment for a trade or business test was valid, this partnership was in the business of leasing 
and not merely established as a financing device. Id. 
153. 833 F.2d 1398 (10th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. 
154. Id. at 1406. 
155. R. PIERCE, JR., supra note 123, § 5.1.5, at 127. See supra note 117 and accom­
panying text. 
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own sUbjective standard, an evaluation of risk retained by the lessor, 
that is beyond congressional intent. The Sauey decision 156 returns the 
court to the basic purpose of the statute and enforces within reason­
able bounds the ability of the commonly controlled non-corporate les­
sor to take an ITC. Based upon principles of statutory analysis, 
congressional intent, and judicial deference, the Sauey decision is 
correct. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The result of the foregoing is uncertainty for the taxpayer in his 
business and tax planning and for the Commissioner in determining 
when the ITC should be disallowed. Congress provided that the ITC 
be used for actual investment in business property and so made it 
available to non-corporate lessors under very particular circumstances 
including the strictures of the short-term lease test. The short-term 
lease test supplies a clearly defined standard: the lease must be less 
than half the useful life of the property. Despite this, the courts have 
struggled to reconcile the written lease, the substance of the transac­
tion, and a suspicion of the business practices of commonly controlled 
entities. The court's approach to setting a standard has been fraught 
with confusion. A court applying the Commissioner's realistic con­
templation test to a short-term lease which has been continuously re­
newed will judge the lease to be of indefinite duration at conception. 
The test does not address the possibility that the parties actually in­
tended to create a short-term lease. 
Additionally, in light of the variety of approaches taken by the 
Commissioner, the fairness and legitimacy of a court deferring to the 
Commisioner's interpretation of the short-term lease test is questiona­
ble. The Commissioner's tests are tailored to disallow the ITC rather 
than to interpret the statute fairly. The Commissioner has exceeded 
his limits of discretion. A taxpayer should not be forced into litigation 
simply because of the Commissioner's suspicion of common control 
when Congress has not forbidden the benefits of the ITC to such par­
ties. Simple adherence to the statutory scheme would allow the tax­
payer the requisite certainty in his business and tax planning. 
Gail M Corbett 
\ 56. See supra notes 105-\ 5 and accompanying text. 
